Qatar Threatens Natural Gas Embargo Against The EU

Saad Sherida al-Kaabi, Qatar’s energy minister and CEO of QatarEnergy, has threatened to cut off LNG to the EU, depriving it of an important energy source as it attempts to reduce its dependence on Russian energy. (Photo by KARIM JAAFAR / AFP) (Photo by KARIM JAAFAR/AFP via Getty Images)

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Qatari Energy Minister Saad al-Kaabi sent a letter to the Belgian government in May, Reuters reported, warning may stop exporting liquefied natural gas to the European Union in response to the European corporate sustainability due diligence directive, which entered into force on July 25. The CSDDD requires large companies to remedy environmental harm and human rights concerns (such as forced labor) in their supply chains or incur fines. The rules apply to both EU and non-EU companies with a yearly turnover greater than €450 million. Notably, the rules will be implemented gradually through 2029 based on company size.

Qatari outrage over the directive reflects the country’s reliance on fossil fuel exports and widely reported exploitation of foreign workers. In the above-mentioned letter to Belgium’s government, Al-Kaabi, who is also President and CEO and Deputy Chairman of state-owned QatarEnergy, wrote that if “further changes are not made to CSDDD, the State of Qatar and QatarEnergy will have no choice but to seriously consider alternative markets outside of the EU for our LNG and other products.” His letter questioned the European directive’s climate goals, affirming that Doha has no plans to achieve net zero emissions anytime soon.

According to the U.S. Energy Information Administration, Qatar is one of the world’s top LNG exporters, exported about 9.3 billion cubic feet per day of LNG through the Strait of Hormuz in 2024. With new LNG pipelines opening up in Syria, plus increasingly warm relations between Qatar and Pakistan, Qatar has other options for LNG export flows. Europeans have few equally affordable options. To meet European needs for gas without having to rely on Russia or Qatar, EU countries may look to buying more LNG from the U.S. or revisit local nuclear energy policies.

LNG And The Future Of European Energy

This is not the first time Qatar has threatened to cut off LNG exports to Europe over the CSDDD. “If the case is that I lose 5% of my generated revenue by going to Europe, I will not go to Europe,” Al-Kaabi reportedly said in reference to the associated penalties back in December 2024. “I’m not bluffing.”

If Doha follows through on its threats, the consequences will have ripple effects for European energy security, although EU members may be able to replace the Qatari supply with imports from the U.S., Nigeria, Algeria, and Mozambique. While Qataris could likely find alternate buyers, particularly in Asia and the Middle East, their insistence on long-term contracts with restrictive resale provisions may push Asian buyers, especially the Japanese and South Koreans, to avoid Qatari LNG.

The share of Qatari LNG imports in the EU’s total gas portfolio has increased as Europe continues to seek alternatives to Russian LNG, spurred by Putin’s second invasion of Ukraine in 2022. In the first quarter of 2024, Qatari LNG accounted for 9.1% of the EU’s total imports, and in the first quarter of 2025, this number increased to 10.8%. In 2023, QatarEnergy entered into large LNG contracts with three major companies to supply gas to Europe. It agreed to supply Shell, Eni, and TotalEnergies with several million tons of LNG per year for the next 27 years, providing energy to the Netherlands, Italy, and France, respectively.

Europe’s reliance on foreign LNG stems from policies across several of its states prioritizing renewables to the exclusion of more reliable forms of baseload energy, like nuclear, which makes foreign sources of LNG a key component of the continent’s energy mix. This, in turn, has rendered the EU increasingly vulnerable to shocks caused by international politics.

Qatar’s History Of Human Rights Abuses

For now, at least, Qatar is publicly expressing concern only regarding the CSDDD provisions requiring businesses to implement climate transition plans. However, Qatar’s response to the CSDDD was likely spurred not only by the outsized role of fossil fuels in its economy, but also by its ongoing neglect of safe labor practices and global human rights norms. When Qatar won the bid in 2010 to host the 2022 FIFA World Cup, the next decade cast a harsh light on Qatar’s treatment of the migrant workers building the stadiums and infrastructure, including the country’s first subway system to handle the crowds of anticipated spectators.

In 2022, World Cup Chief Hassan al-Thawadi confirmed that 400-500 migrant workers died working on construction connected to the tournament. In reality, the death toll was probably much higher. Workers were also subjected to unpaid wages, forced labor, dangerously long hours, and other types of abuse. Despite promised reforms and the official abolition of the kefala system in 2016, the Global Slavery Index 2023 estimated that 6.8 people per every 1,000 of Qatar’s 2021 population of 2,818,060 were living in modern slavery, hardly a boon for the Emirate closely controlled by the Al Thani clan for generations.

It’s especially tricky for European leaders to consider how the CSDDD penalties may relate to human rights concerns, given Qatar’s complex role in global extremist movements. Qatar is the key funder of the Muslim Brotherhood, a global Islamist movement, as well as being a key sponsor of the Hamas terrorist movement in Gaza and the West Bank. To make matters even more complex, Doha also has close relations with the Taliban and played a key role in facilitating its return to power in Afghanistan.

The EU is now stuck between its own policy priorities, strict regulatory framework (CSDDD as an example), and its reliance on imported gas. Besides Qatar, Russia was another one of the EU’s two largest LNG suppliers and American LNG cannot replace the shear volume of necessary imports, especially given EU efforts to phase out Russian gas. Even so, the recently announced $750 billion EU-U.S. trade deal signals the potential for more supply to come from America.

While EU leadership may find it more ideologically consistent to stick to the CSDDD rules and phase out continued gas trade with Qatar, implementing that strategy would prove challenging, to say the least. Shifting and diversifying European energy policies would be strategically advantageous in the long term. By looking to nations like the United States and re-examining nuclear energy policies, the EU may be able to carve out a path toward energy security without relying on Qatar and Russia.