One important and intriguing article titled “Trump’s Next Deal Should Be With Kim Jong Un,” written by Bilahari Kausikan, appeared in Foreign Policy on Feb. 26, 2025. It was great to see the article address such a timely and critical issue: U.S. President Donald Trump’s possible deal with North Korean Chairman Kim Jong Un.
I must make it clear at the outset that I agree with the article’s main point in principle: the U.S. government’s North Korea policy has failed, and it is time for something new. However, I disagree with the author’s rationale.
While well-intentioned, the article suffers from several problems. Most notably, it claims there is no possibility whatsoever for North Korea to dismantle its nuclear weapons, a view which warrants more cautious analyses. In addition, the article occasionally presents factually questionable claims. I suggest that Chairman Kim, willing to give up North Korea’s nuclear weapons, could be ready for a deal with President Trump.
Possibility of Zero Possibility
First, the article states, “There is zero possibility of North Korea giving up its nuclear weapons or missile programs.” No, there is a possibility that North Korea could give up its nuclear or missile programs. In the run-up to the historic first summit between the U.S. and North Korea in June 2018, then-CIA Director Mike Pompeo visited Pyongyang and met with Chairman Kim. According to Pompeo, Kim said “I’m a father and I’m a husband. And I have children. And I don’t want my children to carry the nuclear weapon on their backs their whole lives.” Further, according to Moon Jae-in, the former South Korean President, Chairman Kim said a similar thing during their summit meeting in April 2018. Of course, Chairman Kim’s words do not need to be taken at face value. Still, they do suggest a possibility that North Korea would be ready for negotiations over its nuclear weapons.
Second, the article claims, “There is no incentive that can be offered to Pyongyang—or cost that can be imposed—that can persuade or compel it to give them [nuclear weapons] up.” This statement disregards past U.S. experiences of negotiating with North Korea. Going back to the first summit between the U.S. and North Korea in 2018, “Chairman Kim Jong Un reaffirmed his firm and unwavering commitment to complete denuclearization,” provided that “President Trump committed to provide security guarantees to the DPRK [North Korea].” If we look further back to the 1994 Agreed Framework, North Korea agreed to cease its nuclear programs, provided that the “[t]wo sides will move toward full normalization of political and economic relations.” Thus, there are clear incentives that can be offered to Pyongyang, such as security guarantees and reciprocal economic measures.
Incentive for North Korea
Third, as the article points out, “Kim’s signature policy has been Byungjin (“parallel development”), which places equal emphasis on military and economic development, unlike his father’s Songun (“military-first policy”).” This means, North Korea under Chairman Kim is keen to engineer economic development. It could also suggest that North Korea might be open to various measures addressing imbalances between its advanced nuclear programs and backward economic situations. This directly contradicts to the article’s own claim that there is no incentive for North Korea: the country would seek a substantial incentive for economic development. Most importantly, on April 20, 2018, North Korea announced the end of the Byungjin policy and the need for a new strategy: with military development achieved, it is time to solely focus on economic development. Over the course of Byungjin, from Chairman Kim’s point of view, it may have been difficult to give up nuclear programs. Such action could have directly undermined the legitimacy of his signature policy. But with Byungjin no longer in place, he might now be willing to abandon nuclear weapons in exchange for sufficient economic benefits, together with security guarantees, etc. From my perspective, it was no coincidence that North Korea ceased to pursue Byungjin just before the inter-Korean summit on April 27 and the Trump-Kim summit in June 2018. North Korea was sending a signal.
Fourth, the article states, “In South Korea, there is already considerable public support for acquiring nuclear weapons.” Yes, there are several opinion polls showing that South Koreans prefer to have their own nuclear weapons. However, as U.S. Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Nuclear Affairs Alexandra Bell said, “polls are somewhat framed by the way the question is being asked.” That is, the opinion polls presenting positive attitudes toward South Korea’s own nuclear weapons often omit the costs involved: for example, potential economic sanctions by international regimes and the withdrawal of the U.S. troops from South Korea, or weakening of the U.S.-South Korea alliance. Indeed, if those questions are asked, the public support drops to around 38%. The article seems to have presented certain opinion polls selectively to support its claim, rather than exploring a whole picture of the matter.
Opportunities and Sunrises
Taken together, while well-intentioned, the article fails to present factually appropriate and logically consistent arguments. Meanwhile, there remains a strong probability that another summit meeting between Chairman Kim and President Trump could be organized. President Trump has indicated several times this year that he is willing to see Chairman Kim again: on the first day of his second presidency in January, in February, and in March. Given the history of negotiations in 1994 and 2018, Chairman Kim and North Korea could indeed be open to another deal with the U.S. I strongly urge Chairman Kim to seize this rare moment.
North Korea does not have much time. As William Arthur Ward famously said, “Opportunities are like sunrises. If you wait too long, you miss them.”
[Header image: Kim Jong Un and President Donald Trump shaking hands during the DPRK–USA Singapore Summit, 2018. Credit: Shealeah Craighead, Public domain, via Wikimedia Commons]
The views and opinions expressed in this article are those of the author.
Dr Sungju Park-Kang is a Research Fellow at the DPRK Strategic Research Center and Assistant Professor in the Department of Political Science and International Relations at KIMEP University, Kazakhstan. Park-Kang is also Adjunct Professor at the Centre for East Asian Studies, University of Turku, Finland. He was formerly Assistant Professor of International Relations and Korean Studies at Leiden University, the Netherlands and at the University of Central Lancashire, UK.
