(Oil Price)– In the coming days, the media will push themes related to the upcoming meeting between Saudi Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman (MBS) and US President Trump in Washington. While most will be looking at the possibilities of Saudi investments in US LNG via Aramco or defense deals, Saudi Arabia’s mineral strategy and opportunities will also be on the table.
Geopolitically, Washington will also be interested in Saudi Arabia’s international mining investment strategy, through its national champion, Ma’aden, or its sovereign wealth fund, PIF. In the last few years, under Vision 2030, mining has changed from being the poor cousin of hydrocarbons to the “third pillar” of the economy. Results are impressive, especially given that Riyadh now claims $2.5 trillion in untapped mineral wealth beneath its soil, up from an earlier estimate of $1.3 trillion. MBS wants mining to become a serious contributor to non-oil GDP. Reality at present shows that this means two parallel projects: turning the kingdom itself into a mining province and turning the Public Investment Fund (PIF) and Ma’aden into global players in critical minerals supply chains. Both of interest not only to Washington, but also to China, India, and maybe Europe.
The domestic changes have been remarkable, as the Saudi state has done something rare in the mining industry. Riyadh has built a regulatory regime from scratch with capital already lined up. A new mining law, streamlined licensing, and state-funded geoscience have been packaged with generous fiscal terms and a signal that PIF will co-invest where needed. Based on Riyadh’s upgraded estimate of mineral resources at $2.5 trillion, talks are ongoing to unlock at least $75 billion in new mining investments over the coming decade.
The message from Saudi Arabia has fallen on fertile ground; international companies have heard it and are acting. Alcoa has long been embedded in the Ma’aden aluminum complex at Ras al-Khair, holding 25.1% stakes in the bauxite, alumina, and smelter JVs. Mosaic partnered with Ma’aden in phosphate, while the international mining giant Barrick set up a 50-50 JV to operate the Jabal Sayid underground copper mine.
Western powers have increased their attention, especially after Asian interest has been materializing. New exploration licenses were awarded to Ajlan & Bros with China’s Zijin Mining and to India’s Vedanta. These licenses cover nearly 4,800 square kilometers of copper, zinc, gold, and silver prospects. At the International Mining Forum 2024 in Riyadh, nine metals and mining deals worth more than $9bn were signed, such as a copper project by Vedanta at Ras al-Khair and a phased zinc–lithium–copper complex by Zijin. Chinese involvement and possible high interest in other projects are worrying the USA and Europe, as they could mean another power play within the Kingdom. Metals and minerals are geopolitical-geo-economic power-play instruments, in which Washington and Beijing are on a collision course.
Saudi mining giant Ma’aden holds the pivotal position in this domestic build-out. While it is majority-owned by PIF (around 65%), the company has behaved like both a national champion and a private company. In recent years, it has ramped up production in gold, phosphates, and aluminum, while now targeting copper and, increasingly, lithium. Signs are clear: based on a non-binding term sheet with Aramco and KAUST to explore a minerals venture focused on energy-transition metals, including lithium extraction from unconventional sources, Saudi Arabia wants to produce, not just import, battery metals by the late 2020s.
The most interesting part of the ongoing strategy is outside of the Kingdom. Since 2023, when Manara Minerals, a JV between PIF and Ma’aden, was established as its dedicated outbound mining arm, significant investments have been made. Manara’s mandate is unequivocal; the company will need to buy into copper, nickel, lithium, and rare-earth assets abroad and use those stakes to secure long-term offtake for the kingdom’s future industries. Main clients inside the Kingdom will be electric vehicles, batteries, data centers, and defence.
The results are impressive, as shown by Manara’s $2.5 billion acquisition of a 10% stake in Vale Base Metals, the energy transition division of Brazilian giant Vale. In the next 10 years, Brazil’s Vale expects to spend $25–30bn in copper and nickel projects in Brazil, Canada, and Indonesia. Ambitions are very high; Vale wants to triple copper output and almost double nickel production. By investing in Vale via Manara, the Kingdom is now plugged into the growth. Not only will Riyadh have financial exposure, but it can also negotiate leverage in future supply contracts.
At the same time, Manara’s portfolio is expanding and will continue to grow. At present, the company is in advanced talks to acquire a minority stake in First Quantum’s Zambian copper and nickel assets. At the same time, it is expected to buy 10–20% of Pakistan’s $9bn Reko Diq copper–gold project, which is already seen as a future giant in the global copper industry. The deal, slated to be between $500 million and $1bn, will be done via an equity stake purchased from the Pakistani state. In Africa’s mining hotspot, the Democratic Republic of Congo, PIF and Ma’aden are exploring a $3bn joint venture, combined with other African jurisdictions. Riyadh seems not to be buying control, but adjacency. The strategy is to have enough equity to negotiate supply, technology transfer, and political goodwill, without taking on full operator risk.
In January 2026, the Future Minerals Forum (FMF) 2026 will be held again, the diplomatic theatre for Riyadh’s strategy. Already termed as the “UN of Minerals”, almost like Saudi Arabia’s Future Investment Initiative (Davos in the Desert), the forum will be drawing more than 18,000 attendees, 70 ministers, and hundreds of CEOs to discuss mineral security, critical supply chains, and the energy transition. During FMF 2025, 126 agreements and MoUs worth roughly SAR107bn ($28.5bn) were signed across exploration, financing, R&D, and processing. The 2026 version is expected to be even harder hitting, as it is labeled the “Dawn of a Global Cause” in mineral supply chains. In another move, Riyadh has signed or is negotiating mining and critical minerals partnerships with the UK and the United States, explicitly framed around copper, lithium, and nickel for EVs and AI-hungry data centers. MBS’s Washington visit could also address these deals. While the world is talking to Riyadh, it still feels strange to see the lack of movement from Brussels and from companies in its member countries.
Saudi’s approach is not charity, but precise hedging. Europe’s dependence on Russian gas and the US’s dependence on Chinese processing have shown Riyadh to act. Saudi experts and officials have concluded that minerals will be the next arena where reliability is priced at a premium. The hedging position is powerful, as for Washington, a Saudi partner in copper, nickel, and rare earths is preferable to a Chinese one. For the UK, especially London, a Gulf hub for critical minerals trade (Riyadh) looks like a hedge against insecure supply from Congo or Indonesia. When looking at the reasons for Saudi Arabia, it is clear that these partnerships convert its cash and its geography into political leverage in capitals that still shape security guarantees and technology flows.
Geo-economics is also clearly at play. Saudi PIF’s own strategy calls for at least $40bn a year in domestic investment and for international assets to make up roughly a quarter of its $1.07trn target balance sheet by 2025. For the Kingdom, mining is the bridge between both, as it is an option to diversify away from oil and to build downstream manufacturing in EVs and defence, while it also inserts itself into value chains that will outlive the Internal Combustion Engine.
The road is clear, successes are there, but it is also full of tensions and constraints. PIF’s governor has said the fund plans to reduce the share of foreign investment by at least 20% to focus more on domestic ventures, even as Manara is told to scale up overseas mining bets. Some analysts are warning that the more capital the kingdom ties up in copper pits in Pakistan and Zambia, the less it has for Vision 2030 white elephants at home. Saudi reality shows that mining is capital-intensive and slow, taking almost a decade from a MoU signed in a Riyadh conference hall to the first ton of copper cathode. MBS and its proponents now need to adjust to a new reality. The MBS political system, which has grown accustomed to immediate, visible mega-projects, now needs to get used to the grind of permitting, community relations, and ESG scrutiny in Congo or Pakistan, which may prove frustrating. Speeding up the process may require the involvement of others, maybe Washington-based players?
At the same time, Riyadh is slowly understanding that its game is not one-sided; there are more players in it. Already inside the Gulf, Saudi Arabia is not the only player, as shown by Abu Dhabi’s ADQ and Mubadala, both exploring critical minerals. Abu Dhabi’s new giant IHC is also targeting mining. At the same time, the Kingdom will need to deal with Qatar’s sovereign vehicles, as they are slowly probing metals supply chains. Within Africa, Saudis will need to confront China’s Zijin, a formidable competitor across Africa and Latin America. At the same time, Saudi Arabia is finding that its pivot to the East (Asia) and its cooperation with China don’t remove the primary market constraint: China’s processing dominance and its grip on many upstream projects.
Mining has also become a primary political tool for Riyadh. Manara’s planned entry into Reko Diq is not just a copper investment, but also a reinforcement of the growing geopolitical and military link with Pakistan. Riyadh is no longer only a critical creditor but also a partner in Islamabad’s foreign-policy balancing. Inside Africa, the situation is very tricky. A serious investment move into Congo will thrust Saudi Arabia into the messy politics of resource nationalism, artisanal mining, and human rights scrutiny that it has so far watched mainly from afar. The capabilities of Saudi officials and diplomats will be challenged.
Still, mining will be on the table in Washington, as a tool for MBS to recalibrate his relations with the Trump Administration and the financial and mining backers available. At present, a US-Saudi mining cooperation agreement is being prepared, with critical minerals explicitly on the agenda alongside more traditional energy and defence issues. MBS’s message will be challenging but also attractive to some. The Crown Prince will tell the White House that the Kingdom is no longer just a swing producer of oil; it wants recognition as a future swing investor in the metals that underpin clean energy, AI, and defence industrial bases. For Washington, the latter is of immense interest, as access to Saudi capital and Saudi-backed offtake will support American and allied mining projects to clear financing hurdles. MBS will want, in return, that Washington shows political recognition of its new role.
The MBS bet is challenging for all sides. It will only be positive if Saudi Arabia can show it can take minority stakes in complex jurisdictions and still secure reliable, ESG-compliant supply without getting sucked into local governance crises. At the same time, the rush for critical assets has already driven up project valuations; the Kingdom could risk overpaying for middling assets. Western countries will need to decide whether they are comfortable swapping some dependence on Chinese processing for a new degree of reliance on a highly centralized Gulf monarchy.
MBS’s theory at present is based on the assessment that in a world where everyone is anxious about securing copper, nickel, and lithium, partners will forgive a lot. Even though MBS’s Vision 2030 started as a blueprint to diversify away from oil, the Kingdom’s mining strategy is its most explicit acknowledgement that Riyadh’s influence in a post-oil world will still be built on the ground beneath other people’s feet.
By Cyril Widdershoven for Oilprice.com
