Pakistan’s exploding security situation springing out from its western border catches many political commentators by surprise, especially given Islamabad’s closer historical partnership with the Taliban. Since Aug. 15, 2021, the Taliban has followed the policy of continual hostility for Islamabad’s security apprehensions, even questioning its own past relationship with Pakistan. Taliban’s volte-face reflected through sponsoring and sheltering anti-Pakistan militant groups like Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP) and the growing intimacy with India and Iran, mainly considered the regional competitors of Pakistan.
The obvious explanation for the Taliban’s drift away from Pakistan, as noted by many Afghan experts, is the mistrust and skepticism that Pakistan garnered through over the two decades of the American-led coalition’s presence in Afghanistan, which involved backing the Western forces against the Taliban and its allies: including information sharing, providing air space and logistical assistance through Karachi port.
Under pressure from the then-US administrations, Pakistan launched numerous military operations against those militant groups that were the core backers of the Afghan resistance against the US. These actions encompassed Operation Al-Mizan (2002-2006), Operation Rah-e-Haq (2007), Operation Sher-e-Dil (2008), Operation Zalzala (2008-2009), Operation Sirat-e-Mustaqeem (2008), and Operation Rah-e-Rast (2009). Currently, there is the operation Azm-e-Istehkam. These military operations leave a painful legacy for Pakistan.
The circumstances even became worse for the Taliban when Pakistan, following the urging of the US, conducted military operations against Al Qaeda within Pakistan, a key partner of the Taliban against the US. Moreover, Islamabad was instrumental in the capture of several key Al Qaeda figures, such as Abu Zubaydah, Ramzi bin al-Shibh, and Sharib Ahmad. Ayman al-Zawahiri, the head of the al-Qaeda network, was killed in a Kabul guest house in 2022, allegedly with a drone operated from Pakistan.
Pakistan’s punitive measures were not confined only to the allied groups; even the Taliban themselves became prey to this campaign. Several Taliban figures, such as Mullah Bradar and Mullah Abdul Salam Zaeef, were detained and tortured to the point that it still lingers in the minds of the Taliban leadership.
Pakistan’s intervention in the internal affairs of Afghanistan has always been a contentious issue between the two countries. Islamabad has adopted this colonial legacy by attempting to utilize Afghanistan to achieve a strategic edge over India through a military strategy known as “the strategic depth policy,”. As criticized by Mohammad Yaqoob Mujahid, “We do not permit foreign interference in our domestic matters…. Historically, our approach has been that it is the Afghans who should make these decisions.”
Trust Deficit: The Catalyst for Open Hostility
Due to her uncertain role in the war on terror, Pakistan’s credibility as a reliable partner in the eyes of the Taliban faces many questions. The lack of trust apparently seems to be the driving force behind the Taliban’s recent policy shift away from Pakistan. It is evident in an unwavering support for the TTP at the cost of Pakistan, the Durand Line issue and growing intimacy with Pakistan’s regional rivals like India and Iran.
The Taliban has expressed strong opposition to Pakistan’s border fencing by dismantling and destroying the fencing infrastructure. Suhail Shaheen has openly rejected the legitimacy of the Durand Line, referring to it as “simply a line.” Since their return to power, the Taliban have strategically focused on the border issue to provoke nationalist feelings and garner public legitimacy on both religious and nationalistic grounds.
Another contentious issue is the weaponization of TTP by the Taliban. In response to Pakistan’s request for strict action against the group, Zabiullah Mujahid remarked that the organization should not be deemed responsible for the security shortcomings of another nation, advising Pakistan to effectively handle its circumstances. The UN report states, “The Taliban has continued to offer logistical and operational assistance, as well as financial backing to the TTP; the family of [TTP leader] Noor Wali Mehsud received a monthly stipend of 3 million Afghanis (about $43,000).”
Furthermore, the Afghan Taliban’s growing penchant for India is more than enough to divulge the Taliban’s true intentions. India is working to strengthen its ties with the Taliban’s current regime. Both nations are concentrating on economic partnerships and transit routes. The Taliban has also lauded India for its humanitarian support. India has also improved trade through the Chabahar port in Iran. The growing relationship between India and the Taliban is undoubtedly a warning sign for Pakistan. Mullah Yaqoob, the son of Taliban founder Mullah Omar, states his desire to cultivate friendly and respectful ties with India.
Besides the presence of India, Tehran’s presence in Taliban’s Kabul is full of complications for Pakistan. Owing to the fact that it provides Afghanistan with an additional economic, diplomatic and security avenue to circumvent Pakistan’s overbearing interference. Scaling back the initial sectarian-based aversion, the Taliban are now promoting an economic-oriented approach in dealing with Tehran, such as the Chabahar agreement.
In response to the Taliban’s dissociation from Pakistan, Islamabad has started to send back 1.7 million undocumented Afghan refugees. In a warning to Pakistan concerning the refugee situation, Mullah Yaqoob, the interim defense minister of Afghanistan, stated that Islamabad will face consequences for this crisis created by human actions. Pakistan’s counter-response will lead the situation nowhere. The need is to address the issue of trust deficit, which has ravaged the regional peace.
Muhammad Nauman Akhter holds a PhD in International Politics from Shandong University, Qingdao Campus, China. The views expressed in this article are those of the author.
