The recurring conflict between Cambodia and Thailand is most often presented as a border dispute. Yet this classic geopolitical reading masks a deeper reality: bilateral tensions stem primarily from the internal political fragilities of both countries. More fundamentally, this conflict illustrates a central principle of international relations: two democracies virtually never go to war with each other.
Democratic Peace as an Analytical Framework
The so-called democratic peace theory rests on a robust empirical observation: states endowed with effective democratic institutions—free elections, political pluralism, alternation of power, freedom of expression—tend to resolve their disputes through negotiation rather than confrontation. The accountability of leaders to citizens, the electoral cost of war, and the mutual recognition of political legitimacy all play a major deterrent role.
The Cambodian–Thai case falls into a gray zone, marked by a profound democratic asymmetry between the two countries.
Thailand: An Unstable but Genuine Democracy
For decades, Thailand has experienced chronic political instability: coups d’état, party dissolutions, rapid alternation of governments, and constitutional manipulation. Yet no leader has managed to remain in power continuously over a long period, as political continuity has regularly been interrupted by institutional or military crises.
Despite these weaknesses, Thailand retains a key element of democracy: generally competitive and unpredictable elections. Electoral outcomes are not known in advance and can produce genuine surprises, as recent electoral history has shown and as the popular consultation scheduled for April 2026 may again demonstrate. Above all, all participating political parties generally recognize the results of elections, which gives the electoral process a minimal but real legitimacy.
Thailand therefore, suffers more from a deficit of democratic stability than from an absence of democracy.
Cambodia: A Durably Entrenched Autocracy and a Mafia State
The situation is far more troubling in Cambodia. The country has been dominated for more than forty years by Hun Sen, whose regime has progressively eliminated any credible political competition. Elections are held regularly, but their outcome is largely known in advance, which nullifies their democratic significance. The main opposition party (the CNRP before its arbitrary dissolution in 2017) has consistently denounced rigged elections, while a majority of international observers—NGOs, electoral missions, and independent institutions—have sharply criticized their lack of transparency and fairness.
But Cambodia’s democratic deficit is not merely a political problem: it is inseparable from the country’s gradual transformation into a genuine mafia state. Under Hun Sen’s rule, Cambodia has become a central hub for transnational criminal networks, on whose financial support the regime’s survival largely depends.
These networks are notably involved in:
online scams, operating on an unprecedented global scale;
human trafficking, with thousands of victims lured or forced to work in cybercrime centers;
forced labor, often akin to a modern form of slavery;
and money laundering, involving astronomical sums integrated into the Cambodian economy through real estate, casinos, and so-called “special economic zones.”
This reality received spectacular confirmation on the international judicial stage. On October 14, 2025, a New York court ordered the freezing of USD 15 billion (representing one third of Cambodia’s GDP) belonging to the Prince Group, a Cambodia-based conglomerate headed by Chen Zhi, a personal adviser to Hun Sen and to his son, Prime Minister Hun Manet. This judicial decision marked a major turning point, exposing in broad daylight the close links between Cambodia’s political power and international criminal financial circuits.
In this context, nationalism and external tensions—particularly with Thailand—are not merely tools of political diversion, but also instruments of survival for a regime whose legitimacy rests neither on the ballot box nor on the rule of law, but on coercion and a criminal economy.
External Conflict as a Political Symptom
On both sides of the border, tensions serve as an outlet for domestic difficulties:
in Thailand, they can be mobilized to unite a fragmented public opinion and divert attention from internal political crises;
in Cambodia, they play a more structural role, legitimizing an authoritarian power presented as the guarantor of national sovereignty.
But this instrumentalization is profoundly asymmetrical. A democracy, even an imperfect one, possesses mechanisms of correction and self-regulation. An authoritarian regime, by contrast, tends to freeze conflicts and export them outward.
Conclusion: The Conditions for Lasting Peace
Lasting peace between Cambodia and Thailand cannot be achieved without addressing the deep political causes of the conflict.
Thailand needs to strengthen its political stability through democratic reforms that consolidate institutional continuity, civilian supremacy, and lasting respect for the verdict of the ballot box.
Cambodia needs a genuine democratic transformation: the end of Hun Sen’s authoritarian regime, the restoration of political pluralism, and respect for the 1991 Paris Peace Agreements, which explicitly stipulated the establishment of a liberal and pluralist democratic political system—exactly the opposite of the current regime in Phnom Penh.
Ultimately, peace between the two countries depends less on territorial disputes than on the capacity of their societies to sustain legitimate democratic institutions. As long as this condition is not met, the conflict will remain above all a reflection of unresolved domestic political crises.
[Photo by Hariboneagle927, Public domain, via Wikimedia Commons]
The views and opinions expressed in this article are those of the author.
Sam Rainsy, Cambodia’s finance minister from 1993 to 1994, is the co-founder and acting leader of the opposition Cambodia National Rescue Party (CNRP).
