China’s relationship with Kuwait is the best amongst all the gulf states, and emblematic of problems confronting American policy and global energy markets.
AFP via Getty Images
Princess Dr. Sheikha Al-Anoud Ibrahim Al-Duaij Al-Sabah of Kuwait stepped before an assembled crowd in Kuwait City in August to inaugurate the Kuwait-China Friendship Club. The Sheikha is the Club’s Honorary President. She is also a member of the Al-Sabah dynasty, which has ruled Kuwait since 1756. Last but not least, she has been involved with Chinese relations since at least 2012.
The Friendship Club, like the once ubiquitous and now controversial Confucius Institutes that dotted the West, is more than simply a cultural exchange. It enables the growing reach and influence of China in Kuwait, a country of only 1.3 million citizens, which has maintained very close relations with the United States since U.S. and allied forces spent blood and treasure to restore the exiled Al-Sabah regime to power in the limited 1991 Gulf War. That conflict was triggered when Iraq under Baathist dictator Saddam Hussein invaded Kuwait in 1990 and threatened Saudi Arabia.
For some, the Friendship Club may be seen as a natural extension of globalization, a harmless gesture of goodwill. For others, particularly those in the Western foreign policy communities, it is the latest sign that Kuwait may be shifting its geopolitical weight eastward. These concerns are not simply ideological. They are rooted in questions of accountability, military alignment, and energy policy, all of which have seen Kuwait and China grow even closer this summer.
Kuwaiti And Chinese Military Ties
During the global war on terror, Kuwait cooperated with the U.S. and served as the launchpad for the 2003 invasion of Iraq. This may have masked an uncomfortable truth from the direct gaze of Washington D.C. policymakers, for a time. . Prior to the war, Kuwait was the only Gulf state to pursue closer ties with the Soviet Union. Both before and after the Gulf War, Kuwait was playing the field. The Arab nation was not wed to American interests Shortly afterward, Kuwait began getting closer to China. Today, neither the theoretical incompatibility of China’s Communist Party-ruled state with Kuwait’s absolute monarchy, nor Beijing’s mistreatment of Uyghur Muslims, create any stumbling blocks for Kuwait’s foreign policy. Instead, alignment on energy policies and economic interests define Kuwait’s priorities.
This new closeness has been a long time in coming. In 1995, only four years after the Gulf War, Kuwait signed a military cooperation agreement with Beijing. In August 2025, Kuwait and China pledged closer military cooperation ahead of the anticipated launch of a jointly built ammunition plant. That factory, about which little is known, is now nearing completion. Additionally, joint military training programs between Kuwait and China have been ongoing since 2019.
Meanwhile, the United States maintains over 13,000 troops in Kuwait, with eight military bases, including strategic Camp Arifjan. Kuwait City engaging in deeper strategic cooperation with China doesn’t just have “strategic implications” for Washington – it may contradict U.S. interests. Ammunition production and joint military training are not soft-power initiatives. By engaging in this slow but deliberate dance with Beijing, tiny Kuwait is placing giant China squarely inside the Gulf’s security ecosystem while still relying on the U.S. for security.
This hospital in the Jahra Governate of Kuwait was constructed by the Metallurgical Corporation of China. It is emblematic of the increasingly broad and deep ties between China and Kuwait
Xinhua News Agency via Getty Images
Energy Entanglements
Energy has been a central focus of Kuwait’s foreign policy for decades. It was Kuwaiti energy falling into Saddam Hussein’s hands, added to the threat his occupation posed to neighboring oil-rich Saudi Arabia, that sparked the Gulf War. Now, with China already the the largest purchaser of Arab Gulf energy, Beijing has a lot of leverage. This isn’t limited to hydrocarbons. Earlier this year, Kuwait signed a wide-ranging agreement with Chinese companies to significantly expand its solar energy capacity. On the surface, this means clean energy, diversification, modernization. But scratch deeper and the complications emerge.
Kuwait’s expanding energy partnership with China mirrors Beijing’s broader strategy across the developing world — tying up infrastructure and energy deals that create dependencies rather than mutual prosperity. Kuwait, once a model Gulf technocracy, appears increasingly drawn into this web and seems to be picking up Chinese habits.
Nowhere is this more evident than in the controversy surrounding the Al Zour refinery, one of the largest in the Middle East. Built with significant contributions from foreign contractors, including South Korea’s Hyundai, the U.S.’ Fluor, and Spain’s Tecnicas Reunidas, the project has become a diplomatic headache. Kuwaiti entities have reportedly failed to pay hundreds of millions of dollars owed to these firms. Many suspect that the failure to pay companies, most of whom are from the West, is the result of pressure from Beijing.
This has not gone unnoticed in Washington. In a rare move, the U.S. Congress last month inserted pointed language into its National Security, Department of State, and Related Programs Appropriations Bill, criticizing Kuwait by name for its failure to resolve these debts. The legislation directs the Secretary of State to “utilize the various tools of diplomatic engagement” to resolve the dispute. This is the diplomatic equivalent of a low growl that signals rising frustration.
Kuwait City Playing Both Sides Of The Street
Some in Kuwait’s leadership may believe they can hedge between East and West, cultivating Chinese capital while relying on American protection. This is an illusion. Saudi Arabia tried and was forced to choose between Beijing and Washington on several critical engagements. Iran went all in on supporting China, only to find it a fair-weather friend last June during the war with Israel. Kuwait may soon learn the same lesson.
Sheikh Mishal Al-Ahmad Al-Jaber Al-Sabah, Kuwait’s octogenarian Emir, can continue expanding energy and trade partnerships. However, developing alliances with one great power while actively distancing from the other and refusing to pay the bills may lead to engagement from the U.S. and necessitate even more reliance on China in the future. Whether China will offer the same security that the U.S. currently does remains to be seen. The United States, as recent dealings with Ukraine have shown, does not take kindly to partners who ignore its core security concerns. If the North Atlantic Treaty Organization isn’t sacrosanct, then Kuwait certainly isn’t.
The Kuwait-China Friendship Club and the slate of unpaid bills revolving around the Al Zour refinery may yet prove just a bump in the road. However, both should serve as a wake-up call. In matters of statecraft, optics matter. In choices of alliance, clarity counts. Kuwait remains one of the most strategically located countries in the Gulf. But that reputation rests on its ability to act as a trusted, reliable partner. If that reputation is compromised, if U.S. interests appear threatened, global energy markets and Washington policymakers may respond with a heavy hand.
